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THE ROLE OF LITIGATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: THE POWER PLANT SITING PROBLEMt
DAVID SIVEtt
THE WHETHER QUESTION
It is unfortunate that in virtually all of the literature and dis-
cussion of problems of power plant siting and the environment, the
very denomination of the problem entraps the environmentalist. To
escape from that trap, the very statement of the problem must first
be broadened to pose what I call the whether question, as well as the
where and how questions. By this I mean that in connection with
any particular proposed plant-atomic, fossil fuel or pumped storage
-the alternatives we want considered include that of not building the
plant at all and not supplying at all the particular power.
I hasten to add that this does not mean that I take the position
that no additional power is needed. In most areas, if only because of
population increases, some additional power is needed. But if that
additional amount is represented as "X," and the portion of it to be
supplied by any proposed plant by "Y," the alternative I want con-
sidered is simply that the total additional amount that is to be sup-
plied be "X" minus "Y," or that the "Y" portion be postponed.
Asking the whether question, considering the no-plant alternative,
is not simply an environmentalist's plea. It is a sound, currently
applicable rule of law. In the leading Supreme Court case of Udall v.
Federal Power Commission, generally referred to as the "High Moun-
tain Sheep" case,' the Supreme Court found that the question of
"whether any dam should be constructed" as distinguished from the
question of whether a private or federal agency should construct the
High Mountain Sheep Dam, was unexplored in the record.' The
Court held that the public interest required a consideration of the
more basic issue.
The Court observed that:
The issues of whether deferral of construction would be more in the
public interest than immediate construction and whether preserva-
tion of the reaches of the river affected would be more desirable and
in the public interest than the proposed development are largely
unexplored in this record.
tPortions of this article were presented to the National Academy of Engineering the
"Committee on Power Plant Siting."
ttMember of the firm of Winer, Neuburger & Sive, New York City; LL.B. 1948,
Columbia University.
1. 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
2. Id. at 436.
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A license under the [Federal Power] Act empowers the licensee to
construct, for its own use and benefit, hydroelectric projects
utilizing the flow of navigable waters and thus, in effect, to ap-
propriate water resources from the public domain. The grant of
authority to the Commission to alienate federal water resources does
not, of course, turn simply on whether the project will be beneficial
to the licensee. Nor is the test solely whether the region will be able
to use the additional power. The test is whether the project will be
in the public interest. And that determination can be made only
after an exploration of all issues relevant to the "public interest,"
including future power demand and supply, alternate sources of
power, and public interest in preserving reaches of wild rivers and
wilderness areas, the preservation of anadromous fish for commercial
and recreational purposes, and the protection of wildlife. 3
Another recent judicial recognition of the whether question is set
forth in the case of Department of Water and Power v. Hearing Board
of the Air Pollution Control District of the County of Los Angeles.4
The court, recognizing the need in the city of Los Angeles for addi-
tional electricity, stated:
It is reasonable to hold, therefore, that the public interest in pre-
venting any increase in the levels of air pollution and in seeking a
diminution in the current levels of air pollution in the Los Angeles
Basin, is an overriding public interest which must stand paramount
and supreme when contrasted with the public interest of the resi-
dents of Los Angeles in obtaining all the electrical power they may
desire. No substantial evidence has been presented to prove that the
residents of Los Angeles are in any real danger in the foreseeable
future of having an insufficient amount of electric power to supply
their basic needs. They may not have sufficient electrical power to
supply all of their peripheral needs or demands created by good and
effective advertising copy put out by the Department of Water and
Power. But if the residents of the Los Angeles Basin are ever to live
in an atmosphere having air of a satisfactory quality, it may be
essential that they be willing to make some sacrifice in the amount
of electricity they use and enjoy over the next few years.'
The refashioning of national priorities which poses the whether
question, as a matter of law in important resources disposition cases,
is also manifested in the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969,6 Title I of which sets forth a "Declaration of National En-
3. Id. at 449.
4. No. 971, 991 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Jul. 9, 1970), 1 Environment
Reporter 1580 (1970).
5. Id. at 1624-5.
6. 42 U.S.C.A. 4321 (Supp. 1971).
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vironmental Policy" and a mandate that federal agencies effect that
policy, and Title 1I, creating the "Council on Environmental
Quality" ("CEQ"). The declared purpose is broad:
To declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment
and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich
the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources
important to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environ-
mental Quality.7
The Act further directs that "the Congress authorizes and directs
that, to the fullest extent possible (1) the policies, regulations and
public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and ad-
ministered in accordance with the policies set forth in this Act."
My last citation with respect to the whether question is perhaps
more authoritative than the strictly legal sources. The August, 1970
Report of the Energy Policy Staff, Office of Science and Tech-
nology,' in its basic conclusions and recommendations, sets forth as
the last of its "Conclusions and Recommendations" the following
comments on "The Role of Growth in Demand":
1. The rapid growth in demand for electricity and energy and
materials generally will continue to exacerbate the environmental
problems even though part of the growth will be needed to utilize
electricity for uses such as sewage treatment plants, rapid transit
systems, and recycling wastes which effect major improvements in
the quality of the environment. The issue is often raised: "Is this
plant really needed?" But the basic question of whether electricity
use is growing toe rapidly cannot be answered on an individual plant
basis. It is but part of the much larger and fundamental question of
the pattern of growth for the nation's future. An answer requires a
broad examination of the significance of all forms of energy to the
economy and the public welfare, including analysis of the form and
amount of energy that would be used if the projected increases in
electricity consumption were materially curtailed. It would also in-
volve an examination of pricing policies, rate structures, advertising
programs, tax policies, and other factors in the economy affecting
growth.
2. The relative costs and benefits of present policies as contrasted
7. The Act declares a number of other policies and objectives in great detail. Its first two
subsections (a) and (b), are replete with references to the need for harmonizing Man and
Nature. Subsection (c) sets forth a congressional declaration, "that each person should enjoy
a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the environment. Id.
8. U.S. Office of Science and Technology, Electric Power and the Environment (1970)
[hereinafter cited as O.S.T. Report].
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with a policy of discouraging growth in energy use should be care-
fully evaluated. It may well be timely to re-examine all of the basic
factors that shape the present rapid rate of energy growth in the
light of our resource base and the impact of growth on the environ-
ment. We raise the issue here for further study and discussion.9
(emphasis supplied)
The foregoing is proof that the whether question is a legitimate
one. Perhaps the single most important aspect to environmentalists
of any proposed resolution of the problems which are the subject of
your Committee's study is the capacity to litigate fairly that whether
question. What is meant by "litigate" and why that procedural aspect
of our complex of problems is so important leads me to a short
discussion of adversary proceedings and their place in the resolution
of those problems.
THE PLACE OF ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS
The historical place of adversary proceedings in the development
of the problems and controversies to which we now apply ourselves
need not be documented at length. That such private litigation,
meaning litigation by responsible organizations of what constitutes
the public interest in important environmental cases, is an important
environmental enforcement technique, was officially determined by
the Internal Revenue Service in its resolution of the question it itself
raised approximately six months ago with respect to the proposed
denial of the right to deduct as charitable contributions grants by
foundations and other grantors to public interest law firms. IRS
officially sustained the place of public interest law firms (which in-
clude the legal arms of the principal national conservation organiza-
tions) as long as they follow certain guidelines fashioned primarily to
prevent the representation of the "public interest" from becoming a
device for private profit.
Why do environmentalists regard the adversary process and the
role of the courts so highly? The first reason is the adversary pro-
ceeding has been most successful, particularly in the early years when
the environmentalist cause was more wilderness oriented, more
provincial, than today. The second and more important reason in-
volves both a philosophical proposition and a basic look at tech-
niques for arriving at truth and wisdom in cases where both un-
reasonable and reasonable minds may differ.
The philosophical proposition is, at the heart of the democracy
versus plutocracy argument. How often have all of us heard the
9. Id. at 5.
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suggestion that we could solve our difficult environmental problems
-power versus natural beauty, downhill skiing versus wilderness, and
others-if only we would get the right people around a quiet table, to
talk it over in cocktail-softened tones, and compromise? The answer
given is that (1) the problems are too complex, (2) they need the
clarification of a clash, and (3) nobody can really tell by whom and
how it is to be determined who are the "right people."
There is no set of "right people" to make important environ-
mental decisions. Those basic and general enough to call for legis-
lative or other political resolution require the melting pot of our
traditional political processes. Not wanted is an environmental
aristocracy of Weyerhausers, Udalls, or Charles Reich's, any more
than one wants a foreign policy dictated solely by a few generals or
Yale or Harvard professors. Important environmental controversies
not basic or general enough to be susceptible of express legislative
determination should be aired and enlightened by a litigating process.
That process has as its principal features examination and cross-
examination and reasoned exclusion of what is irrelevant from the
bases of determination.
Part of the environmentalist's philosophy of faith in adversary
proceedings is the rejection of the expertise of administrative
agencies in the resolution of important environmental disputes.
Succinctly stated, it is believed that in any environmental con-
troversy involving the weighing of conflicting values, the weigher
should be a court, a generalist, rather than an administrative agency
whose outlook is organically developmental and provincial. It is
beyond the scope of this article to state with any more particularity
why environmentalists do not want a single purpose administrative
agency to weigh the conflicting values.' 0
The litigation process should not alarm us. It need not, and
conducted by responsible attorneys and principals generally is not,
hostile or bitter. The capacity of groups representing different
interests to present their views forcefully and even passionately, but
with tolerance and appreciation of opposing views, is, fundamental
to the very survival of our political and judicial processes. Much of
the explosive force of the environmental movement results from the
at first small and now growing number of important litigations.
Litigation has inherent drama. Claims and counterclaims somehow
achieve legitimacy and importance when made within the bounds of
10. The best statement of this is in the detailed eloquence of Professor Sax. J. Sax,
Defending the Environment (1971). See also William O. Douglas, Points of Rebellion
(1969). My own analysis of the subject is in Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental
Lawer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 612-15 (1970).
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a legal proceeding. Whatever the explanation, an environmental law-
suit can be and has frequently been an effective political instrument.
The conservationist may lose the case and win the war. The examples
are legion. I cite only the one that was my first court involvement for
the Sierra Club or a similar group. Three years of legal effort resulted
in the defeat in court of individuals and corporations seeking to
enjoin the construction of a cafe in the southeastern corner of Cen-
tral Park, New York, which was to be financed by a gift of Hunting-
ton Hartford, Jr., by which, I have always assumed, he sought to set
out the intimations of his own immortality. By the time of the final
turndown of the opponents of the cafe by the highest Court of
Appeals of New York State, however, Lindsay became Mayor, and
the son of one of the plaintiffs, Thomas Hoving, Jr., became Park
Commissioner. Mr. Hartford's fame rests primarily on a museum a
few blocks west and out of the Park.
The possibilities of litigation as a political instrument in our
environmental cause pose some dangers. Courts should not be used as
political ploys, for reasons which go much beyond the breach of
lawyers' professional ethics which may be involved. Their functions
are far too important and their difficulties far too great to subject
them to being turned into such instrumentalities. On the other hand
the fact that there may be a political means of resolving a legal issue,
particularly one involving important public environmental claims,
should not forbid resort to the litigating process. The use of litigation
as a part and parcel of corporate proxy fights has always seemed to
me to raise similar questions. Perhaps environmentalists should have
the same rights as corporate empire builders.
My upholding of the litigating process does not mean that I am
satisfied with present procedures. I think most environmentalists
are as dissatisfied as power proponents with the length and com-
plexity of present procedures, particularly those before the regula-
tory commissions. While delay in one sense serves the purposes of
those who oppose any building projects, it should be clear that the
resources of the environmentalist opponents are a tiny fraction of
those of the proponents, and that the opponents do not have the
ready vehicle of rate charges by which they pass their costs on to
consumers.
SOME SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES
There is widespread demand, perhaps stronger among power
proponents than opponents, for reform of power plant siting pro-
ceedings, to simplify and shorten the processes. One of the longest
and most complex, and one which is in many respects the very womb
[Vol. I I
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of our power plant siting problems and environmental law as a
separate field of law, is, of course, the Storm King Mountain case.
Seven years is, of course, too long to resolve most power plant con-
troversies. It is not too long, in my opinion, for a landmark case, if
we can assume that there are not more than a few of such character.
Perhaps the principal plea of power proponents and many of the
public regulatory bodies is to simplify and speed up the permit
process. One of the suggested ways of doing so is to have a "one-
stop" proceeding, meaning, one proceeding in which all of the
aspects of a particular project, including the environmental aspects,
can be heard and determined. The clearest and sincerest plea for this
reform is that made by Charles Luce, President of Consolidated
Edison, summarized in the Interim Report of the New York
Temporary State Commission on the Environmental Impact of Major
Public Utility Facilities:
After reviewing the many questions involved, that executive sug-
gested "better mechanisms were needed to resolve the conflict be-
tween these two incompatible goals." He further concluded: "the
shortcoming, I believe, is that there is no coordinated, systematic
review by a single regulatory agency in which all of the factors
necessary to a wise decision can be considered: the need for the new
power supply, the reliability of the proposed project, the relation-
ship of the project to other new power projects to be constructed in
the region, the cost of the project, its impact on the environment
and the available alternatives." 1 1
The coordinated, systematic review by a single regulatory agency
is the one-stop process. The one-stop process is suggested to avoid a
horizontal profusion of administrative agencies and the vertical pro-
fusion of state, local and regional authorities.
Most responsible environmentalists would agree that there should
be a one-stop process, with the following provisos: (1) that the deter-
mination by the "single regulatory agency" is subject to adequate
judicial review, assuming that the single regulatory agency is an ad-
ministrative agency of the traditional public utility commission type;
and (2) that there is also, both at the administrative, regulatory
agency level, and on the judicial review level, private representation
of the public environmental interest, of the type and in the manner
that such representation has developed in recent years.
There is a certain skepticism concerning the sincerity of some of
the advocates, not including Mr. Luce, of the single regulatory
11. Interim Report of the New York Temporary State Commission on the Environ-
mental Impact of Major Public Utility Facilities, Dec. 15, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Mc-
Gowan Commission].
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agency suggestion and the underlying plea for some speed-up of the
procedures. It is not uncharitable to express the view that some of
the cries for such simplification result from the difficulties of the
present system. Use of long drawn out legal proceedings by corporate
enterprises, including public utilities, to serve their own purposes, is
not a new idea of mine. The merits of the plea for a single regulatory
agency and speed up of the procedures cannot and should not, how-
ever, be determined by speculation as to the motivation of some of
the pleaders.
Support of a one-stop process, eliminating the power of small
municipalities to prevent the construction of important power plants
or transmission lines by the exercise of their zoning powers, is stated
with full knowledge that in several cases presently pending, zoning
power has been exercised by municipalities with the fervent support
of environmental groups to prevent such construction. It is my
sincere conviction that environmentalists cannot call for regional
planning to prevent the authorization by municipalities of garbage
dumps in the center of lovely rural areas, and at the same time be
against regional planning with respect to power plants and trans-
mission facilities.
Environmentalists also support simplification and speed-up of the
actual proceedings. Any discussion of the means by which this can be
done is beyond the scope of this article.
Any speed-up of procedures should not, however, be at the ex-
pense of the full and fair presentation of their positions by all re-
sponsible parties and agencies. That full and fair presentation
requires, in my opinion, a basic addition to the quasi-judicial process
of determination of power plant applications and controversies-
provision for adequate discovery of all of the relevant information, in
substantially the same manner provided by most codes of civil pro-
cedure, the best example of which is the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for discovery in all plenary suits.
There is little use to an environmentalist group or any other per-
son or group with the right to intervene to have simply 30, 60 or 90
days' notice of the hearing at which the issues will be tried. If one
side to the controversy, the applicant-company side, is permitted to
take as many months as necessary in the preparation of the applica-
tion and case, with all of the information in thier possession only,
the other side can not be expected to make any effective presenta-
tion of their case on such notice. Far longer notice is necessary,
together with the right to examine all of the underlying documents
and data and to question the proponents of the project by written
interrogatories or oral depositions, substantially in the same manner
[Vol. I11
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as that which is deemed indispensable in the trial of most civil
actions.
The grant of such discovery rights is not inconsistent with speed-
ing up the entire process. What is necessary is a far earlier disclosure
by the applicant utility company of its long-range plans and of its
specific plan for any particular project. Such disclosure should not be
resisted. The information, as well as every other asset of the utility
company, belongs to the public who are its subscribers and con-
sumers. There should be no place for what lawyers call the "support-
ing theory of justice" in power plant proceedings.
A second reform environmentalists seek is substantive. It goes to
the heart of the whether question and our national priorities. The
basic criteria by which the to-build-or-not-to-build question is deter-
mined must be stated so as to avoid a presumption that what an
applicant seeks to build should be built. The environmental effects
should be given at least equal weight with the desire for more power
in the determination of whether to build or not to build. The clearest
statement of the problem of the basic criteria and priorities is de-
tailed in Comments on Legislation to be Proposed Regarding Pro-
cedures to Regulate Siting of Major Public Utility Facilities. 12
Drafted initially by Albert Butzel, Esq., it describes "three different
policy determinations that might be made in connection with siting
legislation for major public utility facilities," to wit:
A. The importance of meeting the demands for more electricity
may be regarded as paramount. In this event, the demand for elec-
tricity would be the controlling factor, requiring the construction of
new facilities even if the environmental impact were serious and sub-
stantial. Environmental factors would still be relevant insofar as it
was possible to minimize the adverse impact, and, in this connection,
the availability of alternatives, together with their relative costs,
would be an important consideration. But given a choice between
unmet demand and substantial damage to the environment, the
demand factor would control.
B. The importance of preserving the environment from sub-
stantial damage may be regarded as paramount. In this event, preser-
vation of the environment from serious and substantial damage
would be regarded as the controlling factor, requiring that no facility
be built if such were the impact even though this resulted (or might
result) in compulsory restrictions on power consumption.
C. The importance of meeting power demands and protecting the
environment may each be regarded as basic concerns, with neither
12. Committees on Administrative Law, on Atomic Energy, on Environmental Law and
on Science and Law of the Bar Association of the City of New York, submitted to the
McGowan Commission.
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given priority over the other. In this event, no single consideration
would be regarded as controlling as a general policy. The demand for
electricity, the relative economics of meeting this demand, the ad-
verse effect on the environment and other relevant social costs and
benefits would be considered on a case-by-case basis, with authority
in the certifying agency to balance all the pertinent factors and, in
effect, to establish priorities in the light of all the circumstances,
including the quality of the environmental resource involved and the
adverse impact of construction upon such resource. A determination
of policy along these lines should make it clear that, depending upon
the particular circumstances, power demands might be regarded as
controlling in one instance even though the adverse environmental
impact were substantial, whereas in another case the protection of
the environment might be given priority even though this might
result in compulsory restrictions on power consumption. 13
Most of the organic statutes creating and describing the powers
and jurisdiction of utilities commissions adopt the first of the policy
determinations described above. The power demands are regarded as
paramount; the environmental considerations are secondary and
often limited to dressing up the affected terrain by the planting of
vines, painting concrete green, and other deceptions. Federal law
now places environmental considerations on or close to a parity. The
parity, however, should be clearly and expressly stated in the organic
statute, and not left to deduction.
The McGowan Commission has prejudged this issue. A quote from
its Interim Report of December 15, 1970, demonstrates this, express-
ing not only such pre-judgment but some barbs at environmentalists
not becoming a supposedly quasi-judicial body at all cognizant of the
crisis that brings us together in a search for environmental wisdom:
Electric energy requirements are known to be growing rapidly.
New York State generating companies and agencies had capability
for supplying electric energy at a rate of 11.6 million kilowatts in
1960. This capability had increased about 100% to 23 million kilo-
watts by mid-1970. It is estimated that this capability must be 41
million kilowatts by 1980, 55 to 65 million kilowatts by 1990 and
substantially more than that by the turn of the century, although
quantitative projections beyond 1990 are considered to be nebulous
at best. The utility facilities required to supply these needs are recog-
nized to have important, in some cases dramatic effects on the en-
vironment in the localities where they are built and operated. That is
particularly so in cases of large generating stations.
Air, water and land pollution and aesthetic factors are significant
in this regard. Some, perhaps including a few who most desire the
13. Id.
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convenience of electric service, decry and would even seek to forbid
creation of the necessary facilities because of these factors. Within
the framework of existing statutory, administrative and judicial
procedures means have been found whereby major utility plant
construction projects have been delayed, some for many years,
beyond initial planned operating dates and some have been cancelled
notwithstanding demonstrable requirements for added capability.
As is indicated in further detail below, this is in part due to the
existence of an overlay of regulatory jurisdiction affording, in some
cases, as many as thirty agencies of government an opportunity to
refuse to approve or to delay a proposed project. Some have been
delayed at the federal level; at least one, in New York State, at the
municipal level. Companies affected are concerned over their future
ability to provide service unless there is created a new governmental
mechanism qualified to recognize the needs of a community for
additional electricity, and authorized to provide for that need, not-
withstanding contrary views from many persuasive elements of
society. Others, perhaps no less concerned, suggest an agency so
authorized could infuriate such elements of society and make mat-
ters more difficult.1 4
The McGowan Commission should have read the O.S.T. Report.
A final comment on statutory reform relates to the definition of
the scope of review by courts of the regulatory agency's power plant
determinations. I strongly support review somewhat broader and
deeper than that under the traditional arbitrary and capricious
rule.' How much broader and how much deeper I do not know.
Nor do I have the expertise to attempt to draft a different rule, or to
determine whether the common law can work out refinements neces-
sary in this environmental age. I leave that to the law and public
administration scholars such as Professors Louis Jaffe, Walter Gell-
horn, Kenneth Culp Davis, and Joseph Sax.
14. Id.
15. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See
generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. and L. Jaffe, Judicial
Control of Administrative Action (1965).
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